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The Illegality of the U.S. Policy of Preemptive 
Self-Defense Under International Law 
Chris Bordelon* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks in the 
United States, domestic and foreign political actors who might 
otherwise have balked if the world’s lone superpower claimed a 
broad right to use force abroad instead offered the U.S. a strong 
showing of goodwill and support.1  Perhaps interpreting this 
solidarity as willingness to support American uses of force abroad 
regardless of their permissibility under international law, the 
Bush administration articulated a provocative interpretation of 
the right of self-defense recognized in the United Nations 
Charter.  In a formal policy statement, the administration 
claimed that this right, which is an exception to the general 
prohibition of the use of force in international relations, justified 
the use of preemptive force against “enemies” of the United 
States.2 
The Bush administration’s assertion of a right of preemptive 
self-defense, along with its reliance on this purported right to 
justify its use of force against Iraq, has drawn considerable 
criticism on international law grounds.3  It is debatable whether 
 
* Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  J.D., Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson School of 
Law.  Member, Pennsylvania and New Jersey bars.  Assistant Counsel, Office of the 
General Counsel, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.  In expressing the opinions set forth 
herein, the author speaks only for himself. 
 1 See George K. Walker, The Lawfulness of Operation Enduring Freedom’s Self-
Defense Responses, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 489, 494-95, 498-505 (2002-2003) (describing 
Congressional and foreign reactions to September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and global 
support against terrorism); JOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RULE OF LAW 
IN INTERATIONAL AFFAIRS 167 (2004) [hereinafter J. MURPHY] (“The international reaction 
to the attacks was swift and almost universally one of outrage and support for the United 
States.”). 
 2 National Security Council, The National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America, at 15 (September 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html 
[hereinafter NSS]. 
 3 See, e.g., Major Joshua E. Kastenberg, The Use of Conventional International Law 
in Combating Terrorism: A Maginot Line for Modern Civilization Employing the 
Principles of Anticipatory Self-Defense & Preemption, 55 A.F. L. REV. 87, 88 (2004) (“[A] 
pressing question that has emerged on the world stage is whether and anticipatory self-
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anticipatory self-defense is permissible under international law.  
However, the Bush administration’s preemption strategy calls for 
the use of force beyond the scope of the right of self-defense, even 
if the right is broadly construed. 
The Bush administration released its formal policy 
statement, “The National Security Strategy of the United States 
of America” (“NSS”), in September 2002.4  This document 
outlines various considerations that are said to guide the 
administration’s foreign policy decisions.5  Of particular interest 
is the document’s treatment of two categories of “enemies:” 
“terrorists” and “rogue states.”  The NSS contains no specific 
definition of the term “terrorists.”  However, the term includes 
states that “knowingly harbor or . . . aid” terrorists.6  The NSS 
defines “rogue states” as those states with characteristics that 
match certain enumerated criteria and explicitly includes Iraq 
and North Korea in this category.7  The document argues that 
the emergence of these “new deadly challenges” has effected a 
“profound transformation” in the “security environment,”8 and 
has brought about a “new world” in which “the only path to peace 
and security is the path of action.”9  In the context of the NSS, 
the noun “action,” the verb “act,” and various derivations of these 
words were used euphemistically to refer to the use of military 
force by the U.S. against its “enemies.”10 
The “action” contemplated against terrorists and rogue state 
is not limited to deterrence of and response to the use or threat of 
force by these groups, but includes action “against such emerging 
threats before they are fully formed.”11  The U.S. will “not 
hesitate to act alone” to prevent terrorists and rogue states from 
attacking or threatening to attack, and will “exercise [its] right of 
self-defense,” as the administration understands it, “by acting 
preemptively.”12  The U.S. will “no longer solely rely on a reactive 
posture as [it did] in the past,” nor will it “let . . . enemies strike 
first,” or “remain idle while dangers gather.”13  Thus, under the 
NSS, military force is to be used preemptively to “forestall or 
 
defense and preemption are legitimate international law concepts.”). 
 4 NSS, supra note 2. 
 5 NSS, supra note 2. 
 6 NSS, supra note 2, at 5. 
 7 NSS, supra note 2, at 13-14. 
 8 NSS, supra note 2, at 13. 
 9 George W. Bush, Introduction to The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America, para. 5 (September 2002), available at  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html [hereinafter Bush]. 
 10 See NSS, supra note 2, at 15. 
 11 Bush, supra note 9, at para. 5. 
 12 NSS, supra note 2, at 6. 
 13 NSS, supra note 2, at 15. 
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prevent . . . hostile acts by our adversaries.”14  While the 
administration suggested at least one other justification for using 
force against Iraq,15 it relied in part on its asserted right to 
preemptive self-defense.16  The commencement of U.S. efforts to 
put its theory of preemptive self-defense into practice warrants 
an examination of whether self-defense is a valid justification for 
using force in these circumstances.   
The authors of the NSS believe that the preemptive use of 
force is compatible with international law.17  The NSS states 
that, “[f]or centuries, international law [has] recognized that 
nations need not suffer an attack” before using force in self-
defense “against forces that present an imminent danger of 
attack.”18  Preemption, the document asserts, has been regarded 
as legitimate under international law when undertaken with 
respect to an “imminent threat—most often a visible 
mobilization” of military forces.19  Without further explanation of 
what “imminent threat” means, the NSS asserts that “[w]e must 
adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and 
objectives of today’s adversaries.”20  “The greater the threat” 
posed by these adversaries, the “more compelling the case for 
taking anticipatory action . . . even if uncertainty remains as to 
 
 14 NSS, supra note 2, at 15. 
 15 The U.S. also justified its use of force against Iraq by citing several Security 
Council resolutions authorizing force.  See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
USE OF FORCE 192-93 (2000) [hereinafter GRAY, USE OF FORCE] (describing the lack of 
acceptance by other states of earlier U.S. claims that authorization to use force against 
Iraq could be implied from past Council Resolutions); see also Amy E. Eckert & Manooher 
Mofidi, Doctrine or Doctrinaire—The First Strike Doctrine and Preemptive Self-Defense 
Under International Law, 12 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 117, 125-27 (2004) (noting the 
failed attempt by the U.S. to obtain a Council resolution explicitly authorizing the use of 
force in 2003 and describing U.S. efforts to obtain such a resolution); Ian Johnstone, US-
UN Relations After Iraq:  The End of the World (Order) as We Know It?, 15 EUR. J. INT’L. 
L. 813, 831 (2004) (briefly summarizing the arguments for and against the purported 
Council authorization). 
 16 Eckert & Mofidi, supra note 15, at 123, 128; Lucy Martinez, September 11th, Iraq 
and the Doctrine of Anticipatory Self-Defense, 72 UMKC L. REV. 123, 123 (2003-2004); see 
also World Press Review Online, The United Nations, International Law, and the War in 
Iraq, http://www.worldpress.org/specials/iraq (describing speeches by President Bush and 
Secretary of State Colin Powell that suggested self-defense as a justification for the use of 
force against Iraq) (last visited Nov. 12, 2005). 
 17 See NSS, supra note 2, at 15; John B. Bellinger III, Authority for the Use of Force 
by the United States Against Iraq Under International Law (Apr. 10, 2003), at 
http://www.cfr.org/publication.php?id=5862 (statements by the United Nations Secretary 
General, phrased similarly to language in the NSS, to the effect that the proliferation of 
highly destructive weapons justify the conclusion that “states cannot be required to wait 
for an attack before they can lawfully use force to defend themselves”); see also J. 
MURPHY, supra note 1, at 176 (noting that the NSS asserts a right of preemptive self-
defense, and adding that “it is by no means clear . . . that the [2002] attack against Iraq 
can be justified as an act of self-defense). 
 18 NSS, supra note 2, at 15. 
 19 NSS, supra note 2, at 15. 
 20 NSS, supra note 2, at 15. 
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the time and place of the enemy’s attack.”21 
The NSS’s brief mention of the legality of the new U.S. 
strategy provides an incomplete analysis of the relevant norms.  
The NSS treats the permissible temporal scope of self-defense as 
a matter of settled law.  It thus ignores an ongoing scholarly and 
international debate concerning when force may first be used.22  
The document also fails to fully consider the application of two 
customary international law principles, necessity and 
proportionality, to uses of force called for by the preemption 
strategy.23  Moreover, the NSS does not indicate the source of the 
authority of the U.S. to unilaterally “adapt the concept of 
imminent threat” to suit its present needs.24  Analysis of these 
gaps in the NSS’s consideration of relevant international law 
suggests that the administration’s confidence in the legality of 
preemptive self-defense is misplaced. 
 
II.  THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND A STATE’S RIGHT OF 
SELF-DEFENSE 
Scholars regard the United Nations Charter (Charter) as the 
“starting point” for analyzing the relevant norms restricting the 
ability of states to threaten or use force.25  The Charter’s text 
amply demonstrates its drafters’ fundamental concern with 
limiting instances in which the use of force in international 
relations would be considered legally permissible.  The preamble 
begins with an expression of the signatories’ determination “to 
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,” and 
describes the “principles and . . . methods” contained in the 
substantive portion of the Charter as being aimed at 
“ensur[ing] . . . that armed force shall not be used, save in the 
common interest.”26  The first of the “Purposes of the United 
Nations” listed in Article 1 is “[t]o maintain international peace 
and security.”27  The second Purpose commits the U.N. to 
 
 21 NSS, supra note 2, at 15. 
 22 See, e.g., GRAY, USE OF FORCE, supra note 15 at 86, 112; Leo Van den hole, 
Anticipatory Self-Defence Under International Law, 19 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 69, 80-82 
(2003-2004) (noting a division of opinion on when self-defense may first be used). 
 23 See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J 14, 98 (June 
27) (discussing customary rules of international law). 
 24 See Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 
117, 125 (Malcolm Evans ed., Oxford University Press 2003) (explaining how customary 
rules are formed). 
 25 Christine Gray, The Use of Force and the International Legal Order, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 589, 590 (Malcolm Evans ed., Oxford University Press 2003) 
[hereinafter Gray, in INTERNATIONAL LAW]. 
 26 U.N. Charter pmbl. 
 27 Id. at art. 1, para 1. 
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“take . . . appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.”28 
A. Article 2(4)’s Prohibition on the Use of Force 
Article 2(4) sets forth a principle that has been described as 
“the heart” of the Charter,29 requiring member states to “refrain 
in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of 
the United Nations.”30  Other provisions of the Charter require 
states that become parties to international disputes to “resolve 
all their disputes by peaceful means.”31  However, Chapter VII of 
the Charter contains two exceptions to the general prohibition of 
the use of force.32  The first exception allows for the use of force 
after the Security Council has “determine[d] the existence of any 
threat, breach of the peace, or act of aggression”33 and “decide[d]” 
that “measures shall be taken in accordance with Article . . . 
42.”34  Article 42 empowers the Security Council to “take such 
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain 
or restore international peace and security.”35  The second and 
more frequently invoked exception is the reservation to states of 
a right of self-defense contained within Article 51.36  The second 
exception establishes that “[n]othing in the . . . Charter . . . 
impair[s] the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations.”37  When the “Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
 
 28 Id. at art. 1, para 2. 
 29 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 117 (Bruno Simma ed., 2d 
ed. 2002) [hereinafter Simma] (quoting Louis Henkin, The Reports of the Death of Article 
2(4) are Greatly Exaggerated, 65 AM. J. INT’L L. 544 (1971)). 
 30 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
 31 Id. at art. 2, para. 3; see also id. at art. 33, para. 1 (“The parties to any dispute, the 
continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and 
security, shall . . . seek a solution by . . . resort to . . .  peaceful means . . . .”); Simma, 
supra note 29, at 584 (describing the relationship between Article 2(3) and Article 33 
provisions). 
 32 The title of Chapter VII of the Charter is “Action with Respect to Threats to the 
Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression.”  U.N. Charter. 
 33 Id. at art. 39. 
 34 Id.; see also id. at art. 41 (The Council may also decide to take measures not 
involving the use of force.). 
 35 Id. at art. 42; see also id. at art. 43, para. 1 (noting that the Security Council may 
call upon other states to contribute forces to a military action authorized pursuant to 
Articles 39 and 42, and those states are obliged to make such forces available). 
 36 Id. at art. 51; see also Richard N. Gardner, Commentary on the Law of Self-
Defense, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 52 (Lori Fisler Damrosch 
& David J. Scheffer eds., 1991) [hereinafter Gardner, in LAW AND FORCE]; GRAY, USE OF 
FORCE, supra note 15, at 84. 
 37 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
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security,”38 however, the right to self-defense terminates.39 
Moreover, a procedural limitation applies:  any measure 
undertaken in self-defense must “be immediately reported to the 
Security Council.”40 
The characterization of the Charter’s text as the starting 
point for analysis of the legality of the use of force is an apt one, 
in part because the relevant text is fairly brief and the rules it 
sets forth do not always provide clear answers when applied to 
particular facts.  Throughout the Charter’s history, states that 
have used force have seized upon potential gaps in the Charter’s 
prohibition of the use of force in order to justify their actions.41  
For example, states have urged that particular uses of force fell 
outside the parameters of the prohibition because the force was 
not used “in the international relations between States.”42 States 
have also argued that their particular use of force was not 
“against the territorial integrity or political independence” of 
another state, 43 or was not “inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations.”44  States that have used force have sometimes 
claimed that these phrases give rise to implied exceptions to the 
prohibition of the use of force, and therefore provide legal 
justification for intervention in other states to achieve objectives 
such as the fulfillment of humanitarian need,45 the attainment of 
self-determination,46 the installation of democratic regimes,47 or 
 
 38 Id. 
 39 See id. (“Nothing . . . shall impair the inherent right of . . . self-defence if an armed 
attack occurs . . . until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security.”) (emphasis added); see also J.N. SINGH, USE OF FORCE 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 31 (1984) (acknowledging that “[u]nder Article 51 . . . the 
defending state has to stop its defence” when the Security Council has taken the specified 
“measures”); Gideon A. Moor, Note, The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Article 51: 
Inherent Rights and Unmet Responsibilities, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 870, 882 (1995) (same 
interpretation). Some scholars assert that, for practical reasons, the language italicized 
above is inoperative to terminate the right of self-defense if the “measures” taken by the 
Security Council are only “economic” or “legal” in nature.  See Thomas M. Franck, 
Comment, Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 839, 841-42 (2001). 
 40 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 41 See Jon E. Fink, From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement:  The Blurring of the 
Mandate for the Use of Force in Maintaining International Peace and Security, 19 MD. J. 
INT’L L. & TRADE 1, 7 (1995). 
 42 Simma, supra note 29, at 121-22. 
 43 Simma, supra note 29, at 123; see also GRAY, USE OF FORCE, supra note 15, at 49-
50 (China claims the right to use force against Taiwan on the basis of territorial 
integrity.). 
 44 IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 268 (1963) 
(rejecting such arguments). 
 45 James P. Terry, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention After Kosovo: Legal 
Reality and Political Pragmatism, 2004 ARMY LAW. 36, 38 (2004) (arguing that 
humanitarian intervention is permissible under the Charter as one of the Charter’s 
purposes is protecting human rights; therefore, using force for humanitarian purposes is 
permissible and not inconsistent with the purposes of the U.N.). 
 46 ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 322 (2001) (suggesting that the 
prohibition on force applies only to states in this context and not to “peoples subjected to 
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the preservation of socialism.48 
Questions have also arisen regarding what actions constitute 
“force” for the purposes of Article 2(4).49  Some argue that that 
economic or physical actions not involving military action should 
be treated as involving the use of force,50 as should indirect 
support for military action by groups other than the armed forces 
of the supporting state.51  Moreover, the Security Council’s 
authorization of enforcement actions pursuant to Chapter VII is 
accomplished by passing resolutions that may not clearly define 
the exact scope of the authorization,52 providing states with 
opportunities to justify uses of force that may or may not be 
authorized depending on how one interprets the resolutions at 
issue.53  Similarly, it has also been claimed that Security Council 
resolutions which authorized force in the past have a continuous 
and cumulative effect, with the result that the use of force may 
be resumed at concerned states’ discretion without renewed 
Security Council authorization.54 
Notwithstanding the ambiguities and possible loopholes 
found in Article 2(4), its prohibition on the use of force is widely 
regarded as barring, as a general rule, the nonconsensual use of 
force by one state against another.55  The preemptive measures 
contemplated by the NSS are not consensual in nature.56  
Moreover, the Bush administration has not sought to justify U.S. 
action under the NSS by reference to the questionable exceptions 
 
colonial domination or foreign occupation, as well as racial groups not represented in 
government, [who] are forcibly denied the right to self-determination”). 
 47 Anthony S. Winer, The Reagan Doctrine, the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, and the Role of 
a Sole Superpower, 22 LAW & INEQ. 169, 181 (2004) (explaining the “Reagan Doctrine” as 
the use of military force to preserve democracy). 
 48 Id. at 181 (explaining that the “Brezhnev Doctrine” was the Soviet leader’s 
philosophy that “the Soviet Union had the inherent authority to maintain communism in 
any existing communist state when that system became threatened”). 
 49 Simma, supra note 29, at 117-21. 
 50 MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 687-88 (3d ed. 1991). 
 51 See Military and Paramilitary Activities, (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14, paras. 
191-92, 195 (June 27) (citing favorably resolutions of the United Nations General 
Assembly and the General Assembly of the Organization of American States suggesting 
that force can include actions of irregulars, and assuming that states can be responsible 
for force and armed attacks undertaken by irregulars); Simma, supra note 29, at 119. 
 52 See Jules Lobel & Michael Ratner, Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous 
Authorizations to Use Force, Cease-Fires and the Iraqi Inspection Regime, 93 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 124, 126 (1999). 
 53 See Gray, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 25, at 610 (discussing Security 
Council resolutions that purportedly justified NATO’s 1998 air campaign against 
Yugoslavia). 
 54 See, e.g., GRAY, USE OF FORCE, supra note 15, at 192-93. 
 55 See, e.g., Simma, supra note 29, at 120-21; CASSESE, supra note 46, at 281; SHAW, 
supra note 50, at 688. 
 56 See NSS, supra note 2, at 15-16 (implying that preemptive actions aim to strike at 
adversaries and eliminate the threat they pose). 
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to Article 2(4) just described; rather, the administration argues 
that the unquestionably valid right of self-defense is expansive 
enough to permit states invoking it to employ preemptive force.57  
Although disagreement exists as to whether non-military action 
can constitute force, it is widely held that non-consensual armed 
action by one state against the territory of another— such as that 
called for by the NSS— constitutes a use of force for purposes of 
the Charter’s rules.58  The point at which a state’s support for 
proxies fighting another state will be deemed a use of force by the 
supporting state is not entirely clear.59  There can be no doubt, 
however, that because the use of force called for by the U.S. 
strategy consists of action by the American military, the U.S. is 
responsible for using such force.60 
B. The Right of Self-Defense Under Article 51 
As the preceding discussion suggests, when the U.S. 
undertakes military action under its NSS strategy, it is likely 
making use of force within the meaning of Article 2(4).61  In the 
future, no prior Security Council authorizations to use force are 
likely to be available to provide justification when the NSS 
strategy is applied.  However, the argument will be advanced, as 
it has been in the case of the Iraq war,62 that the force used by 
the U.S. is a legitimate exercise of the right of self-defense 
recognized in Article 51.  The text of Article 51, like that of other 
Charter provisions dealing with the use of force, has given rise to 
important issues of interpretation.  The meaning of the term 
 
 57 NSS, supra note 2, at 15. 
 58 See Simma, supra note 29, at 117-18 (The “correct and prevailing view” is that 
armed force is prohibited; beyond that, arguments have been advanced that economic or 
political pressure may constitute force within the meaning of Article 2(4).); see also 
BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 268. 
 59 See Simma, supra note 29, at 120-21 (noting ambiguities of state responsibility for 
the actions of irregular forces that were addressed in Military and Paramilitary Activities, 
(Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27), and pointing out that “not every act of 
assistance” given by a state to irregulars “is to be qualified as a use of force”).  It is 
uncontroversial, however, that actions undertaken by irregular forces should at least 
sometimes be treated as uses of force by states with which the irregulars are in some way 
connected.  Simma, supra note 29, at 119 n.40 (characterizing this proposition as 
“virtually undisputed”); see also Military and Paramilitary Activities, (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 
I.C.J. 14, paras. 191-92, 195 (June 27) (indicating what force states can be responsible for 
and when armed attacks undertaken by irregulars are considered force). 
 60 Simma, supra note 29, at 119 (viewing as uncontroversial the proposition that 
force under Article 2(4) includes “the open incursion of regular military forces into the 
territory of another State”); cf. Military and Paramilitary Activities, (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 
I.C.J. 14, para. 195 (June 27) (stating that an “armed attack” under Article 51 
“includ[es] . . .  action by regular armed forces across an international border”); Gray, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 25, at 602 (same). 
 61 See NSS, supra note 2, at 15-16. 
 62 See supra note 16 and accompanying text (noting that the U.S. has proffered self-
defense as one justification for the Iraq invasion). 
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“armed attack” in Article 51, and the relationship of that term to 
the “use of force” prohibited by Article 2(4), have been called into 
question.  In particular, controversy exists as to whether or not 
the two terms are synonymous.63  The International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) has suggested that the terms have different 
meanings because some state actions properly characterized as 
uses of force are not of sufficient “gravity” to qualify as armed 
attacks.64  Thus, according to the ICJ, not every “use of force” is 
sufficiently serious to be treated as an “armed attack” that would 
permit a forcible response to be justified as self-defense.65  With 
respect to the Iraq war, however, there has been no showing that 
Iraq used or threatened any force at all in advance of the 2002 
U.S. invasion, much less engaged in an armed attack.66 
It may be argued that the September 11,  2001 attacks 
constituted an armed attack which ultimately gave the U.S. a 
right to exercise self-defense against Iraq.  Prior to that date, it 
was not clear whether a terrorist act could be treated as an 
armed attack;67 however, the Security Council’s response implied 
that the September 11 attacks gave rise to an affirmative right to 
use force in self-defense.68 While the Security Council did not 
declare Afghanistan responsible for the attacks, the U.S. justified 
the war against Afghanistan as an act of self-defense.69  Most 
states were receptive to the notion that Afghanistan was 
sufficiently responsible for supporting the September 11th 
attackers to permit responsibility for the attacks to be imputed to 
Afghanistan.70  The attacks appeared to rise to the level of armed 
attacks within the meaning of Article 51, so U.S. claims of a right 
to use force in self-defense against Afghanistan were widely 
 
 63 Oscar Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force, 53 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 113, 136 (1986) [hereinafter Schachter, In Defense of International Rules]. 
 64 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 103-04 (June 
27). 
 65 See Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of ‘Armed Attack’ in Article 51 of 
the U.N. Charter, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 41, 44 (2002) [hereinafter S. Murphy]. 
 66 J. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 176 (noting that “[t]here is no evidence that Iraq was 
part of an armed attack against the United States”); see also Gray, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, supra note 25, at 605 (concluding that if Iraq were not shown to have been involved 
in planning or undertaking armed attacks against the U.S., then use of force by the U.S. 
against Iraq would be “stretching pre-emptive self-defence to an extreme”). 
 67 See Schachter, In Defense of International Rules, supra note 63, at 139-41 
(describing this as a “controversial question”). 
 68 See Johnstone, supra note 15, at 828. 
 69 See Johnstone, supra note 15, at 828; Jonathan I. Charney, The Use of Force 
against Terrorism and International Law, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 835, 835-36 (2001) (noting 
that self-defense was asserted as the justification for the use of force by the U.S. against 
Afghanistan, and suggesting that the justification may have been valid, but criticizing the 
failure of the U.S. to provide the international community with adequate information or 
to obtain the approval of the Security Council before invading Afghanistan). 
 70 See Johnstone, supra note 15, at 828; J. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 167. 
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perceived as unobjectionable.71  While the U.S. made efforts to 
connect Iraq to the September 11 attacks, the U.S. government 
could not produce the evidence needed to impute responsibility 
for those acts to Iraq.72  Thus, the distinction between the use of 
force and more substantial armed attacks is inapposite,73 because 
Iraq did not use force at all, much less use it in a manner 
substantial enough to give rise to an armed attack. 
Given that Iraq was apparently not responsible for any 
armed attacks against the U.S., one might think that the U.S. 
claim that its use of force against Iraq was undertaken in self-
defense necessarily fails.  The text of Article 51, after all, seems 
to indicate that the right of self-defense arises only when “an 
armed attack occurs.”74  However, in this instance, the text 
obscures an interpretive dispute that hinges directly on the U.S. 
claim.  States and scholars disagree as to the time at which the 
right of self-defense becomes available for exercise.75  
Determining the legitimacy of the U.S.’s claim of a right to use 
preemptive force to defend itself depends upon the extent to 
which self-defense may be exercised in advance of an armed 
attack. 
C. Permissive and Restrictive Interpretations of the Right of Self-
Defense 
Article 51 must be interpreted in order to determine if the 
right of self-defense can permit the use of preemptive force.  The 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which the U.S. has 
signed but not ratified, provides a useful guide to the 
interpretation of the treaty provisions such as Article 51.76  The 
Vienna Convention requires that treaties “be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
[their] terms . . . in their context and in the light of [their] object 
 
 71 See Johnstone, supra note 15, at 828-29; J. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 167. 
 72 Mahmoud Hmoud, The Use of Force Against Iraq: Occupation and Security 
Council Resolution 1483, 36 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 435, 443 (2004); Martinez, supra note 16, 
at 190. 
 73 See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (describing this distinction). 
 74 U.N. Charter art. 51.  
 75 See, e.g., GRAY, USE OF FORCE, supra note 15, at 86, 112 (noting division of opinion 
on the interpretation of the Article 51 text); Van den hole, supra note 22, at 80-83 (also 
noting division of opinion). 
 76 United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 22, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter U.N. Conference]; Charles Lipson, Why Are Some International 
Agreements Informal?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS, A PROBLEM-
ORIENTED APPROACH 39 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff et al. eds., 2002) (The U.S. has indicated that 
the Convention is “the authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice.”). See 
United Nations, Treaty Series, available at  
http://untreaty.un.org/sample/EnglishInternetBible/partI/chapterXXIII/treaty1.htm (last 
visited Nov. 1. 2005) (while the U.S. has signed the treaty, it has not ratified it). 
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and purpose.”77  The relevant “context” includes, “in addition to 
the text, including its preamble and annexes[,]” any agreements 
or instruments agreed to or accepted by “all the parties in 
connexion [sic] with the conclusion of the treaty.”78  In addition to 
context, the primary guideposts to interpretation are: (1) 
“subsequent agreement[s]” regarding the treaty’s “interpretation” 
or “application;” (2) “subsequent practice in the application of the 
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding 
its interpretation;” and (3) “any relevant rules of international 
law.”79  The commentary indicates that some dispute exists as to 
the relative weight to be given to each of the guideposts to 
interpretation, but concludes that most jurists recognize “the 
primacy of the text as the basis for the interpretation.”80 
Scholars endeavoring to interpret Article 51 to determine 
when the right of self-defense arises have employed methods of 
interpretation similar to those endorsed by the Vienna 
Convention, but have drawn different conclusions.  The more 
restrictive position holds that Article 51 forecloses a state’s 
ability to use force in self-defense before an armed attack occurs.  
The more permissive position holds that an armed attack need 
not occur before force may be used in self-defense.81  Instead, 
force may be used in anticipation of an attack, in a manner that 
has been dubbed “anticipatory self-defence.”82  Force used in an 
anticipatory act of self-defense must still meet the necessity and 
proportionality requirements of customary international law, and 
in the context of anticipatory self-defense, the former 
requirement demands a showing that the threat is imminent.83  
The Bush administration asserted that this second, permissive 
viewpoint represents a centuries-old consensus as to the scope of 
the right.84  Furthermore, the administration regards the 
preemptive strategy enunciated in the NSS as an allowable 
 
 77 U.N. Conference, supra note 76. 
 78 U.N. Conference, supra note 76, at art. 31. 
 79 U.N. Conference, supra note 76, at art. 31. 
 80 Lipson, supra note 76, at 58 (“[S]upplementary means of interpretation, including 
the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to 
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the 
meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the meaning 
ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable.”).  The preparatory work of the treaty is thus not referenced here. 
 81 See Gray, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 25, at 600 (summarizing the 
restrictive and permissive positions). 
 82 See Gray, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 25, at 600. 
 83 See Gray, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 25, at 600; Simma, supra note 29, at 
803 (while rejecting the permissibility of anticipatory self-defense under Article 51, noting 
that scholars who believe that anticipatory self-defense can be lawful nevertheless require 
it to be a necessary and proportional response to an imminent threat). 
 84 NSS, supra note 2, at 15. 
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application of the right of self-defense as understood pursuant to 
the permissive position.85 
1.  Treaty Text 
Analysis of Article 51 in light of the Vienna Convention 
sheds light on the disagreement between the restrictive and 
permissive schools of thought.  The text of Article 51 uses the 
phrase “if an armed attack occurs” to describe the situation in 
which the Charter’s operation will not “impair” the right of self-
defense.86  Those advocating the restrictive view may argue 
compellingly that this language indicates that an actual—rather 
than a potential—armed attack is needed to trigger the right to 
use force in self-defense.87  An armed attack is an event capable 
of being perceived and identified as such, and like any other 
event, “occurs” when it “come[s] into existence” or “happen[s],” 
and not before.88  Thus, an armed attack must actually happen 
before it can truly be said that “[n]othing in the . . . Charter” will 
“impair the inherent right of . . . self-defence.”89  Accordingly, 
only an armed attack that is happening or has happened can 
satisfy Article 51’s armed attack requirement.90 
Moreover, the structure of the language used in Article 51 
bolsters the restrictive position.  Article 51 impliedly recognizes a 
general rule of impairment of the right of self-defense when it 
states that nothing in the Charter will “impair” the right “if an 
armed attack occurs.”91  The Article would arguably be devoid of 
meaning if special provisions did not have to be made in order to 
preserve a right of self-defense.92  Thus, the Charter must 
generally operate to impair the right of self-defense; only in 
exceptional cases will it be deemed unimpaired.  The occurrence 
of an armed attack gives rise to the only situation in which the 
Charter states that the right of self-defense is not impaired, 
however “inherent” it may be.93  A familiar canon of construction 
holds that the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of other 
things; as applied to Article 51, this suggests that explicit 
 
 85 NSS, supra note 2, at 15. 
 86 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 87 Eckert & Mofidi, supra note 15, at 137-38. 
 88 WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 817 (1991). 
 89 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 90 See, e.g., S. Murphy, supra note 65, at 44; Quincy Wright, The Prevention of 
Aggression, 50 AM. J. INT’L L. 514, 529 (1956); Simma, supra note 29, at 803. 
 91 Eckert & Mofidi, supra note 15, at 137 (quoting U.N. Charter art. 51). 
 92 See BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 273 (making this point, and stating that “where 
the Charter has a specific provision relating to a particular legal category, to assert that 
this does not restrict the wider ambit of the customary law relating to that category or 
problem is to go beyond the bounds of logic.  Why have treaty provisions at all?”). 
 93 Simma, supra note 29, at 790. 
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exceptions to the general rule of impairment of the right of self-
defense should be deemed exclusive.94  Thus, the language should 
be read to mean that the Charter has rendered the right of self-
defense unavailable prior to the occurrence of an armed attack. 
On the other hand, advocates of a permissive interpretation 
contend that that the text of Article 51 does not purport to grant 
a right of self-defense to states.95  The language of Article 51 
assumes that such a right already existed when the Charter was 
signed; indeed, the right is said to be an “inherent” aspect of the 
sovereignty of states.96  Article 51’s recognition that states’ self-
defense rights are “inherent,” which is defined as “involved in 
[states’] constitution[s] or essential character” and “belonging by 
nature” to states,  suggests that the argument for a restrictive 
approach should be turned on its head.97  The Charter’s drafters 
described the right of self-defense as “inherent” because they 
deemed it a fundamental attribute of state sovereignty.98  
Therefore, Article 51 should not be read as restricting the right of 
self-defense, but as clarifying the right’s continued existence, 
because the drafters would have been explicit if they wished to 
place limitations on a right they considered so important.99 
Scholars adopting a permissive approach endeavor to 
interpret the phrase “an armed attack” in a manner consistent 
with their position.100  Some view the armed attack requirement 
as a reference not only to actual interstate violence, but also to 
actions taken in preparation for the attack.101  Thus, an armed 
 
 94 See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (referencing this 
canon); BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 273 (applying the canon). 
 95 See, e.g., Abraham D. Sofaer, The Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in 
International Law:  Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REV. 89, 
92-93 (1989); John Alan Cohan, The Bush Doctrine and the Emerging Norm of 
Anticipatory Self-Defense in Customary International Law, 15 PACE INT’L L. REV. 283, 316 
(2003). 
 96 See U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations.”). 
 97 See WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 622 (1991). 
 98 U.N. Charter art. 51; see JULIUS STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER: A 
CRITIQUE OF UNITED NATIONS THEORIES OF AGGRESSION 43-44, 44 n.13 (1958) (referring 
to the “continued vigour” of the concept of self-defense and assumption on the part of 
states that treaty provisions would not and could not eliminate this “natural right”); 
Sofaer, supra note 95, at 94. 
 99 STONE, supra note 98, at 43-44; see Sofaer, supra note 95, at 94. 
 100 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 101 See, e.g., Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The New Bush National Security 
Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 375, 425 n.212 (2004) (quoting Sir 
Humphrey Waldock); American Soc’y of Int’l Law, Self-Defense in an Age of Terrorism, 97 
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 141, 148 (2003) (suggesting the permissibility of “nipping an 
armed attack in the bud”).  To the extent that the latter position rejects the concept of 
preemptive self-defense, it allows a state to exercise self-defense when it is positive an 
imminent attack will occur.  It is reactionary rather than anticipatory self-defense, and is 
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attack may be said to have occurred when some state of 
preparation is reached, even before one state actually strikes 
another.102  The definition of “armed attack” must encompass 
more than the ultimate act of interstate violence; otherwise, the 
right would be deprived of the broad scope seemingly appropriate 
to a right inherent in statehood.103  An alternative explanation is 
that Article 51 does not require an armed attack, but merely 
states one instance in which the customary right of self-defense 
is preserved.104  This second understanding is difficult to square 
with the structure of Article 51.  However, the recognized 
inherent and fundamental need for self-defense against 
imminent attack,105 in addition to states’ interpretation of the 
provision,106 may be viewed as justifications for the second 
reading of Article 51. 
The Vienna Convention’s “General Rule of Interpretation” 
does not limit the scope of the “text” considered by an interpreter 
to the specific portion under scrutiny, but instead calls for 
examination of the whole “text, including its preamble and 
annexes,” to aid in interpretation.107  The restrictive school of 
thought points to numerous aspects of the Charter that suggest 
that the avenues left open for the legitimate use of force were 
meant to be narrow.  According to the restrictive view, the scope 
of the right to self-defense recognized in Article 51 is diminished 
by the temporal limitation in the armed attack requirement and 
the Article’s command that the exercise of the right by the states 
is “immediately reported to the Security Council.”108  Moreover, 
the text explains that force used in self-defense must cease when 
the Council “take[s] measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security.”109  If the “inherent” quality of 
the right of self-defense is as important to interpreting Article 51 
as the permissive position posits — supposedly relaxing or 
eliminating the text’s requirement of an armed attack — it seems 
unusual that the right of self-defense would be made contingent 
 
included in this part of the discussion because, although it involves reaction, using force 
in self-defense in instances suggested by this view still precedes the occurrence of any 
interstate violence. 
 102 See Nagan & Hammer, supra note 101. 
 103 See BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 273 (suggesting the need for a broad 
interpretation of inherent right); U.N. Charter art. 51 (outlining the inherent right of the 
states). 
 104 See Gray, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 25, at 600. 
 105 Martinez, supra note 16, at 162-63 (making this argument and referencing 
numerous sources in accord). 
 106 THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND 
ARMED ATTACKS 50 (2002). 
 107 U.N. Conference, supra note 76. 
 108 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 109 Id. 
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upon notification, and subject to limitation by action of a body 
beyond the state’s control. 
With respect to Article 51’s interaction with Article 2(4), 
those urging a restrictive interpretation of the temporal scope of 
the self-defense right can again invoke the canon that explicit 
exceptions are deemed exclusive.  The general prohibition on the 
use of force yields only to a limited number of explicit exceptions, 
including the occurrence of an armed attack.110  If an armed 
attack “occurs” when interstate violence actually “happen[s]” and 
not before, the argument that another, different right of self-
defense may be relied upon before interstate violence actually 
occurs runs afoul of sound textual interpretation.111 
The right of self-defense recognized in Article 51 is merely an 
exception to the general prohibition on the use of force contained 
in Article 2(4).112  This suggests that “[t]he use of force in self-
defense is limited to situations where the state is truly required 
to defend itself from serious attack.  In such situations, the state 
must carry the burden of presenting evidence to support its 
actions, normally before these irreversible and irreparable 
measures are taken.”113  Thus, the Charter affirmatively requires 
U.N. members to rely on alternatives to force to resolve their 
disputes,114 and suggests a number of peaceful means by which 
this obligation may be discharged.115  An annex to the Charter 
was included to give concrete form to one vehicle for peaceful 
dispute resolution, the International Court of Justice, the 
“function [of which] is to decide in accordance with international 
law such disputes as are submitted to it.”116  Also relevant in this 
context is the Charter’s preamble, which explains a central focus 
of the Charter: the common interest in keeping forcible 
 
 110 See, e.g., S. Murphy, supra note 65, at 44. 
 111 See THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 941 (1995) (defining 
“occur”). 
 112 See Simma, supra note 29, at 117, 128, 789 (referring to the prohibition of the use 
of force found in Article 2(4) as the “general” rule and self-defense as an “exception” to 
that rule).  Adherents of a restrictive view of the self-defense right may argue that the 
exceptional status of self-defense warrants a narrow construction of the right.  See Gray, 
USE OF FORCE, supra note 15, at 86-87, 600 (reciting this argument).  
 113 Charney, supra note 69, at 835-36 (criticizing a broad interpretation of the right of 
self-defense on the ground that it would conflict with “core” objectives specified in the 
Charter, including the ‘prevent[ion of] states from using force in international relations to 
promote their policy agendas no matter how just,” as well as with the objectives of self-
defense itself). 
 114 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3. 
 115 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 33 (“[States] shall, first of all, seek a solution by 
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to 
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means.”). 
 116 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 
1055, 1060. 
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exchanges between states to a minimum.117  A restrictive 
interpretation of Article 51 thus suggests that so long as an 
“armed attack” remains a possibility rather than an actuality, 
the Charter’s commands to settle disputes peacefully and to 
avoid the use of force preclude a state from resorting to arms.118 
Lastly, the Charter’s other significant exception to the 
prohibition of the use of force allows for its use pursuant to 
Security Council decisions.119  Article 1(1) expresses a preference 
for the use of “collective measures” as a means of “maintain[ing] 
international peace and security.”120 Article 24 reflects the same 
preference for collective over unilateral action in that it 
established that United Nations “[m]embers confer on the 
Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security.”121  This preference is further 
reinforced by the textually subordinate status of self-defense 
under Article 51, as noted above, in relation to Security Council 
action.122  Arguably, these aspects of the text are incompatible 
with an interpretation of Article 51 that leaves a state free to use 
force against another state before the Security Council has an 
opportunity to consider the situation.123 
Those favoring a permissive approach to interpretation of 
the right of self-defense are likely to view the same portions of 
the text differently.  First, with respect to the provisions for 
Security Council involvement found in Article 51, they regard the 
notification requirement as no more than an administrative or 
procedural matter, imposing no limits on the substantive scope of 
the right enjoyed by the state acting in self-defense.124  As such, 
the fact that a party exercising the right must give notice to the 
Security Council should not be read to suggest that the right 
ought to be narrowly construed.125  The Council’s apparent ability 
 
 117 See U.N. Charter pmbl. (listing reasons why the United Nations was founded; the 
first reason listed is “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice 
in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind”). 
 118 Eckert & Mofidi, supra note 15, at 137-38. 
 119 U.N. Charter arts. 39, 42 (permitting the Security Council to authorize force 
“necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security” if it “determine[s] the 
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression”). 
 120 U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1. 
 121 U.N. Charter art. 24. 
 122 See U.N. Charter, supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text. 
 123 See Charney, supra note 69, at 837 (condemning unilateral uses of force in self-
defense in situations where a state could instead resort to the Security Council’s 
enforcement procedures, on the ground that “the Council, and the United Nations as a 
whole, should be the primary vehicle to respond to threats and to breaches of the peace”). 
 124 See generally Gray, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 25, at 90-91 (noting, 
however, that failure to follow the notification procedure will have a deleterious impact on 
a state’s claim to have acted in self-defense). 
 125 Simma, supra note 29, at 804 n.152 (noting that the “reporting duty” is “rarely 
complied with” and has been “devoid of practical significance” because of the frequent 
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to terminate a properly-exercised right of self-defense is of little 
importance to the issue that divides the restrictive and 
permissive schools of thought — the time when the right may 
first be asserted.126  By the terms of the Charter, the right of self-
defense can be limited only when the Council acts, and then only 
when it takes “measures necessary to maintain international 
peace and security.”127  Moreover, in practice, this limitation has 
little effectiveness, as states have exercised what amounts to 
“concurrent power” with the Council in continuing to defend 
themselves even after taking “measures,” and possess a wide 
degree of discretion in deciding when the Council’s action has 
superseded their right to use force in self-defense.128  For these 
reasons, the Council’s ability to terminate the exercise of a state’s 
right to self-defense should not significantly detract from Article 
51’s recognition of self-defense as an inherent right worthy of the 
liberal interpretation given to it by the permissive school.  
Additionally, the preference for collective over individual action 
to “maintain international peace and security” should not be 
interpreted to imply that the collectivism favored by the Charter 
is at odds with a broad interpretation of the right of self-defense, 
because the self-defense right recognized in Article 51 is itself 
capable of being exercised in a “collective” fashion.129 
Permissive writers claim that the aforementioned canon of 
construction should not exclude anticipatory self-defense unless 
Article 51’s reference to an armed attack intends to foreclose 
anticipatory action.130  In their view, the canon is inapplicable 
because the language requiring an “armed attack” applies only 
when “the Security Council is acting” and takes “measures 
 
inefficacy of the Security Council”).  But see Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 235 (June 27) (suggesting that the fact that a state failed to 
report to the Security Council is significant to analysis of the state’s claim of a right to use 
force in self-defense under the Charter ). 
 126 The issue of whether preemptive self-defense is permissible relates to the 
availability, not the termination, of the self-defense right.  To the extent that it is argued 
that the Security Council’s ability to terminate a state’ s recourse to the right is relevant 
to interpreting the right as it relates to preemptive force, it should be noted that the 
ability of the Security Council to terminate the right has had very little practical impact.  
See FRANCK, supra note 106, at 50 (noting that while Article 51 as drafted grants the 
Security Council the ability to terminate a state’s use of force in self-defense, the 
“coexistence of collective measures with the continued measures in self-defense has 
become accepted practice”). 
 127 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 128 See FRANCK, supra note 106, at 49. 
 129 U.N. Charter art. 51; Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 
MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1639 (1984) [hereinafter Schachter, The Right of States]. 
 130 See STONE, supra note 98, at 44 n.14. (“Any reference based on inclusio unius 
exclusio alterius is neutralized by the clear reference of what is included to the situation 
where the Security Council is acting.”). 
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necessary to maintain international peace and security.”131  
States’ obligation to settle disputes peacefully is inapposite, 
because it has already been breached by the time a state 
exercises its right of self-defense.132  If the right to use force in 
self-defense extends to situations preceding the armed attack, a 
permissive understanding of the right suggests that at some 
point in a potential attacker’s preparations, the potential 
defender’s obligation to settle disputes peacefully must yield by 
reason of the potential attacker’s decision to resort to force.133 
2.  Context and Subsequent Agreements  
The text of a treaty, although perceived by many scholars to 
be of primary importance to the task of interpretation, is not the 
only relevant consideration.  According to the Vienna 
Convention, the treaty’s “context” should be considered, and 
certain other items should be “taken into account.”134  Aside from 
its own text, the Charter lacks a relevant “context” as defined by 
the Vienna Convention.135  The Vienna Convention also calls for 
consideration of “subsequent agreement[s] between the parties” 
pertaining to the treaty.136  Unlike agreements and instruments 
entered “in connexion [sic]with the conclusion of the treaty to be 
interpreted,” which form part of the treaty’s “context” and must 
receive the backing of all other parties to the treaty, subsequent 
agreements may be relevant to interpretation of a treaty even if 
they have not been assented to by “all” the parties to the treaty 
under scrutiny.137  Therefore, agreements postdating the Charter 
that are not backed by all parties to it may still be relevant to the 
Charter’s interpretation.  As a result, a number of widely 
supported General Assembly resolutions may provide insight into 
 
 131 See U.N. Charter art. 51; STONE, supra note 98, at 44 (asserting that “where the 
Security Council is not acting, the broader license of self-defence and self-redress under 
customary international law must surely continue to exist,” and that Article 51 should not 
be read to eliminate states’ “license” to justify uses of force based on customary rules so 
long as the “Council is not acting, [and] there is no inconsistency with the purposes of the 
United Nations”). 
 132 Schachter, The Right of States, supra note 129, at 1635. 
 133 See Simma, supra note 29, at 108-09 (stating that, in principle, this obligation 
“presupposes a right to existence for the party concerned and thus a right to respect for its 
integrity” and adding that “[t]o the extent that the use of force is permissible, an 
obligation to settle a dispute peacefully cannot exist”). 
 134 U.N. Conference, supra note 76. 
 135 U.N. Conference, supra note 76 (To the author’s knowledge, there were no formal 
agreements or understandings made both at the time of and in connection with the 
conclusion of the Charter to which all the parties to the treaty assented that bore directly 
on the issue of the legitimate timing of force used in self-defense.) 
 136 U.N. Conference, supra note 76, at art. 31; see Simma, supra note 29, at 108-09 
(stating that this obligation “presupposes a right to existence for the party concerned and 
thus a right to respect for its integrity[,]” and adding that “[t]o the extent that the use of 
force is permissible, an obligation to settle a dispute peacefully cannot exist”). 
 137 U.N. Conference, supra note 76. 
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Article 51’s interpretation.  Although none of these resolutions go 
directly to the scope of permissible self-defense, what they have 
to say about the use of force as a general matter may still be 
relevant to interpreting the scope of permissible self-defense. 138 
The 1965 U.N. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection 
of Their Independence and Sovereignty (Declaration on the 
Inadmissibility of Intervention) rejects the use of force in 
international relations.  It declares that “[n]o State may use or 
encourage the use of . . . measures to coerce another State . . . to 
secure from it advantages of any kind,” and further enjoins 
States from engaging in “activities directed towards the violent 
overthrow of the régime of another State.”139  This language may 
be understood to condemn acts of self-defense undertaken before, 
or too far in advance of, the occurrence of an armed attack.  
However, the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention 
goes on to disavow any intention that its language is meant to 
“affect[] in any manner the relevant provisions of the Charter.”140 
The 1970 U.N. Declaration on Principles of International 
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among 
States In Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
(Declaration on Friendly Relations) demands that states “refrain 
from the threat or use of force . . . as a means of solving 
international disputes,” and affirms that “[a] war of aggression 
constitutes a crime against the peace” which gives rise to 
criminal “responsibility.”141  The Declaration on Friendly 
Relations provides support for the notion that the right of self-
defense is limited rather than open-ended by declaring that 
forcible “acts of reprisal” are impermissible.142  Additionally, the 
Declaration on Friendly Relations indicates that the obligation to 
settle disputes peacefully continues even after initial attempts to 
do so have failed.143  It is hard to reconcile a process in which all 
parties earnestly endeavor to peacefully settle a dispute with the 
 
 138 GRAY, USE OF FORCE, supra note 15, at 112; Gray, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra 
note 25, at 601. 
 139 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of 
States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), ¶ 
1, U.N. Doc. A/2131 (Dec. 21, 1965). 
 140 Id. at ¶ 8. 
 141 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. 
Res. 2625 (XXV), ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter Declaration on 
Friendly Relations]. 
 142 Id.; see, e.g., CASSESE, supra note 46, at 217 (stating that the principles the 
Declaration on Friendly Relations articulates are often treated as a reflection of 
customary international law). 
 143 Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 141.  But see CASSESE, supra note 
46, at 217 (noting that states are “not duty bound to settle those disputes at any cost”). 
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use of force in advance — or too far in advance — of an armed 
attack by another disputant, the occurrence of which remains 
speculative before violence is brought to bear.144 
An overhasty act of self-defense might well run afoul of a 
third Assembly resolution, the Definition of Aggression, which 
states, “[t]he first use of armed force by a State in contravention 
of the Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of 
aggression.”145  The resolution’s definition of “[a]ggression” may 
be rebutted only pursuant to a Council determination.146  No 
justifications for aggression are identified.147  Like the 
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention, however, both 
the Declaration of Friendly Relations and the Definition of 
Aggression contain language indicating that they are not 
intended to change the Charter’s scope or meaning.148 
Those favoring a restrictive interpretation of the self-defense 
right can argue that the aforementioned resolutions are 
consistent with their view. Specifically, their view is a narrow 
reading of the right that limits its assertion to situations in 
which the Charter clearly recognizes its existence—namely, 
when one state is then undertaking or has already undertaken 
an “armed attack” against the defender.149  Adherents of the 
permissive position may counter that none of the resolutions 
cited explicitly purports to construe the right of self-defense.150  
Furthermore, those favoring a permissive interpretation may 
argue that no inferences about the scope of the rules found in the 
Charter should be drawn.  They can ground this argument on 
traditional reservations about the ability of General Assembly 
resolutions to produce binding legal effects, and the caveats 
expressly included in the resolutions that appear to foreclose 
treatment of the resolutions as authoritative interpretations of 
 
 144 Martinez, supra note 16, at 170. 
 145 Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/3314 (Dec. 14, 
1974) [hereinafter Definition of Aggression] (like the Declaration on Friendly Relations, 
the Definition of Aggression has been cited as a reflection, at least in part, of customary 
international law); see Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J 14, 
103 (June 27). 
 146 Definition of Aggression, supra note 145, at art. 2. 
 147 Definition of Aggression, supra note 145, at art. 5. 
 148 See Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 141, at ¶ 1 (“Nothing in the 
foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as enlarging or diminishing in any way the scope 
of the provisions of the Charter concerning cases in which the use of force is lawful.”); 
Definition of Aggression, supra note 145, at art. 6 (“Nothing in this Definition shall be 
construed as in any way enlarging or diminishing the scope of the Charter, including its 
provisions concerning cases in which the use of force is lawful.”). 
 149 U.N. Charter art. 51; Schachter, In Defense of International Rules, supra note 63, 
at 120. 
 150 GRAY, USE OF FORCE, supra note 15, at 112; GRAY, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra 
note 25, at 601. 
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the Charter.151 Those preferring a restrictive approach could 
respond that the limiting clauses of the resolutions are better 
understood, not as impediments to the use of the resolutions in 
construing the Charter, but as indications that the resolutions 
are intended to restate the Charter’s meaning rather than to 
modify it.152  Moreover, resolutions such as the Declaration on 
Friendly Relations, which received overwhelming support in the 
General Assembly, may be relevant both to interpreting Article 
51 and to independently determining the legality of the use of 
force by contributing to the development of customary 
international law.153 
3.  State Practice 
The Vienna Convention also calls for consideration of “any 
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation.”154  On several occasions since the founding of the 
United Nations, states have used force in a manner seemingly 
akin to anticipatory self-defense.155  The U.S. naval blockade of 
 
 151 See CASSESE, supra note 46, at 160-61 (characterizing General Assembly 
resolutions as ‘soft law’ capable of indicating new trends and concerns but unable to 
impose legally binding obligations); Simma, supra note 29, at 269 (acknowledging that 
Assembly resolutions are nonbinding and that it has been “controversial” to ascribe legal 
effect to them). 
 152 The language used in the resolutions seem to express an intention that the 
resolutions be viewed as efforts to restate rather than to develop the law.  See, e.g., 
Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 141, at ¶ 1 (declaring only that the 
resolution shall not “be construed as enlarging or diminishing in any way the scope of the 
provisions of the Charter”).  Arguments that the Assembly included these clauses to 
express its intent that these resolutions  should be regarded as having no legal import 
even though international law was the subject matter of the resolutions leads to the 
absurd conclusion that the Assembly acted for no reason. 
 153 CASSESE, supra note 46, at 292-93 (noting that significant resolutions may 
“gradually generate[] the possible crystallization of general binding rules or principles”); 
Simma, supra note 29, at 268-73 (describing different theories of the extent to which 
General Assembly resolutions can produce legal effects, and adding that “[i]t is widely 
acknowledged that [Assembly] resolutions may under certain circumstances constitute 
evidence of existing customary law”); see also Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. 
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 101, 103 (June 27) (noting that states’ adoption of the Declaration 
on Friendly Relations was an indication of their opinio juris as to customary international 
law, and that the Definition of Aggression could be “taken to reflect customary 
international law”). 
 154 U.N. Conference, supra note 76. 
 155 Other examples have also been cited as instances of the assertion of a right of 
anticipatory self-defense, but are not discussed here at length because the force used in 
each – whether lawful or not – is better described as responsive.  See Martinez, supra note 
16, at 140-43 (citing U.S. air strikes against Libya in 1986 after the bombing of a German 
nightclub frequented by Americans, U.S. missile strikes against Iraq in 1993 after its 
attempts to assassinate former President Bush, and U.S. missile strikes against Sudan 
and Afghanistan in 1998 after bombings of American embassies).  To the extent that 
these instances were ones in which states argued for anticipatory self-defense, none can 
be said to have resulted in the unequivocal acceptance or rejection of the doctrine.  See 
GRAY, USE OF FORCE, supra note 15, at 116-18. 
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Cuba during the Cuban missile crisis has been cited as an 
example of a case in which preemptive or anticipatory self-
defense was used with international approval.156  The blockade 
should properly be regarded as a use of force157 and was 
apparently undertaken to forestall the installation and possible 
future use of Soviet nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba.158  However, 
while commentators debated the applicability of the right of self-
defense, the official U.S. position did not attempt to justify the 
blockade on that ground.159  Instead, it sought to justify it as a 
measure taken by a regional organization, the Organization of 
American States, pursuant to Article 52.160  The American 
unwillingness to rely on the right of self-defense, especially in 
view of the strong tendency of states to advance self-defense to 
legitimize their uses of force,161 suggests that the U.S. believed 
that self-defense would have been heavily contested as a 
justification.162  Even to the extent that self-defense was raised in 
discussions in the Council, it cannot be said that the Council 
recognized the Cuban blockade as legitimate, as opinion was 
sharply divided, and it is uncertain whether supporters of the 
U.S. position were motivated by Cold War alliance considerations 
or by the U.S.’s proffered justifications.163  Thus, the Cuban 
blockade provides no real support for a permissive interpretation 
of the Charter. 
A second oft-cited example is the Israeli air-strike against 
Egypt at the start of the Six-Day War in 1967.  Prior to the air 
strike, the objective of was to destroy Egypt’s Air Force.  Egypt 
had taken a number of provocative actions in short succession 
that made the onset of hostilities appear imminent, including 
closing the Straits of Tiran to Israeli traffic.164  The Israeli strike 
 
 156 See Van den hole, supra note 22, at 101. 
 157 BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 365-66. 
 158 WILLIAM R. KEYLOR, THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY WORLD: AN INTERNATIONAL 
HISTORY 315 (4th ed. 2001). 
 159 Quincy Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM. J. INT’L L. 546, 554, 560 (1963) 
[hereinafter Wright, The Cuban Quarantine] (noting that the U.S.’s “main argument” was 
that the quarantine was justified by “Articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty of 1947,” 
implemented by a branch of the Organization of American States). 
 160 Id. at 557-59 (setting out the U.S. argument).  The claim that the Cuban blockade 
could be justified as an enforcement action by a regional organization is belied by Article 
52.  See U.N. Charter, art. 52, para. 1 (“[N]o enforcement action shall be taken under 
regional arrangements . . . without the authorization of the Security Council . . . .”). 
 161 Gardner, in LAW AND FORCE, supra note 36, at 52. 
 162 GRAY, USE OF FORCE, supra note 15, at 112. 
 163 See Sean M. Condron, Justification for Unilateral Action in Response to the Iraqi 
Threat: A Critical Analysis of Operation Desert Fox, 161 MIL. L. REV. 115, 136 (1999) 
(noting the split of opinion, which reflected Cold War divisions, but erroneously 
suggesting that the split reflected no ideological divide). 
 164 KEYLOR, supra note 158, at 341-42. 
BORDELON FINAL SENT TO COPY 12/14/2005 5:27 PM 
2005] The Illegality of the U.S. Policy 133 
preceded any interstate violence undertaken by Egypt.165  Israel 
sought to justify its action on grounds of self-defense, arguing 
that the actions taken by Egypt amounted to an armed attack.166  
The Council again split along ideological lines, with the Western 
bloc supporting the Israeli action and the Soviet bloc opposed to 
it.167  However, unlike the example of the Cuban blockade, Israel 
justified its 1967 air raid on the basis of self-defense.168  
However, Israel’s justification was one of ordinary rather than 
anticipatory self-defense:  it argued that the closing of the Straits 
was not merely preparation for war, but was tantamount to an 
armed attack.169  In any event, the U.N. institutions did not 
explicitly accept or reject the Israeli claim.170 
A third historical example appears to have received more 
attention from commentators than the two previously discussed, 
probably because it presented facts most implicative of the 
debate over anticipatory self-defense.  In 1981, Israel launched 
another air-raid, this time against an Iraqi nuclear facility under 
construction near Baghdad.171  While the facility was not yet 
operable, and speculative arguments could have been made as to 
its potential future use as a means of producing nuclear weapons, 
it was clear that at the time of the strike, the unfinished and 
inoperative reactor posed no threat to other states.172  Reliance 
on a right of preemptive self-defense was unavoidable:  Israel 
aimed to justify its use of force by claiming that force was used to 
defend against a threat that would become imminent only in the 
 
 165 KEYLOR, supra note 158, at 341-42. 
 166 Quincy Wright, Legal Aspects of the Middle East Situation, 33 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBLEMS 5, 26-27 (1968) [hereinafter Wright, Middle East Situation] (noting the Israeli 
justification was accompanied by an admission that its air raid was preceded by any 
Egyptian attack); Martinez, supra note 16, at 138-39. 
 167 See Condron, supra note 163, at 137. 
 168 Beth M. Polebaum, Note, National Self-Defense in International Law: An 
Emerging Standard for a Nuclear Age, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 187, 191 (1984). 
 169 Wright, Middle East Situation, supra note 166, at 26 (noting that Israel claimed 
that Egypt’s closing of the Straits of Tiran was an “armed attack”); see also Condron, 
supra note 163, at 136 (discussing the United Arab Republic’s closing of the Straits of 
Tiran and Israel’s previously issued statement that such closing “would constitute an act 
of war”); Martinez, supra note 16, at 138-39 (stating that Israel claimed the “totality of 
the actions of Egypt, Jordan and Syria in fact amounted to a prior armed attack.” 
Therefore, Israel, as such, relied in part on “traditional self-defense.”). 
 170 Wright, Middle East Situation, supra note 166, at 9-11, 27 (describing U.N. 
discussions and resolutions that were inconclusive as to the Israel’s claim to have acted in 
self defense, and noting in the context of a discussion of responsibility for aggression that 
substantial arguments existed to support viewing either side as having acted aggressively 
rather than defensively); Shabtai Rosenne, Directions for a Middle East Settlement—
Some Underlying Legal Problems, 33 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 44, 55 (1968) (noting that 
efforts in the U.N. bodies to “attribute responsibility for the breakdown of peace to one 
side or another” had been unsuccessful). 
 171 Martinez, supra note 16, at 139. 
 172 Martinez, supra note 16, at 139; SINGH, supra note 39, at 46. 
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future.173  The action was met with widespread disapproval, but 
for different reasons.  Some states took a position consistent with 
the restrictive view and argued that no action of the kind taken 
could ever be consistent with the Charter.174  Specifically, Article 
51 had limited the scope of the right, making it exercisable only 
“if an armed attack occurs.”175  Conversely, other states based 
their objection to the Israeli action on customary law grounds, 
arguing that the Israeli strike did not comport with the 
requirements of necessity and proportionality.176  The U.S. 
condemned Israel only for its failure to exhaust peaceful means 
of resolving the dispute.177  The U.N. political organs thus 
condemned the attack without reaching a consensus as to the 
scope of the right of self-defense.178 
The historical practice of U.N. members in dealing with 
claims of anticipatory self-defense suggests that states are not in 
agreement as to the propriety under Article 51 of actions taken in 
self-defense prior to the onset of an armed attack.  While some 
states agree that the right of self-defense includes the right of 
states to deploy force before military force is deployed against 
them, this is not the majority viewpoint.179  States rely 
infrequently on anticipatory self-defense to justify the use of 
force; instead, they attempt when possible to characterize their 
actions as supported by the less controversial right of states to 
use force defensively in response to an armed attack that has 
occurred or is occurring.180 
4.  Relevant Rules of International Law: Customary  
Principles of Necessity and Proportionality 
Customary international law has an important role to play 
in an analysis of the legality of the use of force in self-defense.  
First, according to the interpretive framework set forth in the 
Vienna Convention, “relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties” to the Charter 
must be considered as an aspect of the Charter’s “context” to 
arrive at a proper understanding of the scope of the right of self-
defense recognized therein.181  General rules of customary 
 
 173 See Gray, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 25, at 601. 
 174 Martinez, supra note 16, at 133-34. 
 175 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 176 See Martinez, supra note 16, at 139-40. 
 177 See Martinez, supra note 16, at 139-40 (stating that the U.N. Security Council and 
the United States condemned Israel’s actions and the U.S. specifically admonished Israel 
for its failure to exhaust peaceful means of dispute resolution). 
 178 Gray, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 25, at 601. 
 179 GRAY, USE OF FORCE, supra note 15, at 111-12, 115. 
 180 Id. at 115; see also S. Murphy, supra note 65, at 44. 
 181 U.N. Conference, supra note 76. 
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international law are as valid and applicable in relations 
between the parties to the Charter as are the provisions of the 
Charter itself.182  The obligations imposed by customary rules 
exist independently of any treaty provision.183 
The customary rules factor significantly in the analysis of 
the availability, timing, and permissible scope of the use of force 
in self-defense. Many writers cite the early formulation of these 
rules found in a diplomatic note from U.S. Secretary of State 
Daniel Webster to the British ambassador in 1842.184  The note 
concerned the sinking of an American ship, the Caroline, by the 
British, which was done in order to prevent the ship from being 
used to support rebels opposed to the British colonial 
government.185  The U.S. demanded that the British justify their 
action by showing that the “‘necessity of that self-defense [wa]s 
instant and overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and 
no moment for deliberation.’”186  The American note also 
demanded a showing that the force used involved nothing 
“‘unreasonable or excessive.’”187  Although this note long predated 
the Charter, and was thus the product of a time when resorting 
to force was not unlawful in the sense of the prohibition in Article 
2(4),188 it contains a useful elaboration of the customary 
constraints on self-defense.189  As the letter indicates, use of force 
in lawful self-defense must always be both necessary and 
proportionate.190 
The concept of necessity limits the use of force to situations 
in which forcible “measures . . . are . . . necessary to respond to” 
the armed attack191 or to otherwise repel aggression.192  Peaceful 
 
 182 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 118, at art. 38(1)(a)-
(d) (identifying sources of international law).  The United States has argued in the past 
that the doctrines of necessity and proportionality have been “supervene[d] and 
subsume[d]” by the prohibition on force in the Charter, and the International Court has 
rejected this argument.  See Military and Paramilitary Activities, (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 
I.C.J. 14, at 93 (June 27) (“Principles such as those of the non-use of force . . . continue to 
be binding as part of customary international law, despite the operation of provisions of 
conventional law in which they have been incorporated . . . .”) (citation and internal 
quotations omitted). 
 183 See Thirlway, supra note 24, at 124-25. 
 184 Schachter, The Right of States, supra note 129, at 1634. 
 185 Schachter, The Right of States, supra note 129, at 1634-35; Eckert & Mofidi, supra 
note 15, at 129. 
 186 Eckert & Mofidi, supra note 15, at 130 (quoting BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. 
TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1222 (1991)). 
 187 Eckert & Mofidi, supra note 15, at 130 (quoting BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. 
TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1222 (1991)). 
 188 SHAW, supra note 50, at 682-85 (providing a brief summary of law governing the 
use of force in international relations). 
 189 Eckert & Mofidi, supra note 15, at 129-30. 
 190 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 103 (June 27). 
 191 See id. (explaining that Article 51 does not itself require acts taken in self-defense 
to be “proportional” and “necessary;” Article 51 does not purport to supersede these 
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alternatives must not have been readily available to the state 
invoking self-defense.193  The law recognizes that the use of force 
in self-defense may be necessary for a variety of reasons, such as 
“to hold the aggressor in check and prevent him from continuing 
the aggression,” “to recover territory” recently lost to the 
attacker, or to “repel an attack.”194  The aim of force used in self-
defense cannot be “retaliatory or punitive.”195  When states rely 
upon anticipatory self-defense, scholars who accept that doctrine 
as a valid justification for the use of force generally accept that 
the requirement of necessity demands a showing that the threat 
was imminent.196 
The proportionality requirement, on the other hand, limits 
the amount and scope of the force that may be used to fulfill the 
need to defend.197  The concept that forcible “measures . . . [must 
be] proportional to the armed attack”198 does not demand that the 
defending state limit the size or sophistication of its forces;199 nor 
does it categorically compel a state fighting off an invasion to 
stop its use of force as soon as the invaders are pushed back 
beyond the border.200  However, the force used in self-defense 
must be “proportional to the offense in its extent, manner, and 
goal.”201  The proportionality requirement’s prohibition of 
“unreasonable or excessive” conduct is, in a sense, similar to the 
necessity requirement’s prohibition of “forbidden” conduct 
because in both instances, the conduct that is not permitted will 
vary with the circumstances.202  Sufficient force may be used to 
respond to armed attacks to ensure decisive results, even if to 
achieve them would require modest increases in the force used or 
spatial expansions of the conflict.203  In general, to be 
 
requirements of customary international law). 
 192 Gray, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 25, at 600; see also CASSESE, supra note 
46, at 305 (arguing that the use of self-defense must be limited to “rejecting the armed 
attack”). 
 193 Schachter, The Right of States, supra note 129, at 1635 (agreeing with this 
proposition but recognizing its limits). 
 194 CASSESE, supra note 46, at 305; Gray, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 25, at 
600. 
 195 See Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 141 (“States have a duty to 
refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force.”). 
 196 See, e.g., SINGH, supra note 39, at 16 (accepting anticipatory self-defense doctrine, 
but acknowledging that the state invoking it must be able to show that the threat against 
it was imminent or that there was a “strong probability of armed attack”); see also 
Condron, supra note 163, at 130-31. 
 197 Schachter, The Right of States, supra note 129, at 1637. 
 198 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 94 (June 27). 
 199 See, e.g.,Van den hole, supra note 22, at 103-04. 
 200 Schachter, The Right of States, supra note 129, at 1637-38. 
 201 Schachter, In Defense of International Rules, supra note 63, at 120. 
 202 GRAY, USE OF FORCE, supra note 15, at 107. 
 203 See, e.g., Schachter, The Right of States, supra note 129, at 1637-38; Van den hole, 
supra note 22, at 103-04. 
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proportional to the attack, “the act,  justified by the necessity of 
self-defense, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly 
within it.”204 
Those favoring a restrictive approach to anticipatory self-
defense may argue that these customary doctrines, although 
understood by some writers to permit anticipatory self-defense, 
cannot properly be applied when anticipatory force is used.205  
Determinations of necessity and proportionality, after all, “are 
dependent on the facts of the particular case.”206  The facts of a 
case cannot be meaningfully analyzed before they actually exist; 
analysis before that time is merely speculation.  Thus, one who 
engages in anticipatory self-defense may thwart the application 
of these rules because the need for force and the necessary 
amount cannot be ascertained.207  Before the commencement of 
an armed attack, the use of force in self-defense can only be 
based on a guess as to the hostile intentions of the potential 
attacker.  If the guess is incorrect and the attack never would 
have occurred or could have been peacefully prevented, then 
there was no need for the use of defensive force in any 
proportion.208  Indeed, according to some supporters of the 
restrictive position, force used in anticipatory self-defense cannot 
comply with the rules imposed by customary doctrines.209 
Supporters of the permissive view contend that many writers 
consider the customary rules to permit the use of anticipatory 
self-defense.210  They seek to dispel fears about the potential for 
anticipatory self-defense to encourage reckless uses of force by 
reading the requirement of necessity as incorporating a 
requirement of imminence.211  The requirement of imminence is 
theoretically measurable even in the absence of an armed attack; 
from an objective standpoint, the legality of the anticipatory 
action can be assessed by considering the relevant facts at the 
time defensive force was used.212  The burden of being subject to 
the use of force initially falls upon the potential attacker, but in 
 
 204 See John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 740 (2004) (footnote omitted). 
 205 See BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 257 (noting that many writers believe that 
customary law permits anticipatory self-defense as a general matter, although apparently 
disagreeing on the ground that anticipatory self-defense in fact subverts the application of 
these rules). 
 206 GRAY, USE OF FORCE, supra note 15, at 107. 
 207 See BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 259. 
 208 See MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM, The Myth of Preemptive Self-Defense 19 (2002),  
http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf. 
 209 See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 259, 261-62 (arguing that anticipatory force 
cannot be used consistently with the proportionality requirement). 
 210 See, e.g., Van den hole, supra note 22, at 97. 
 211 See, e.g., SINGH, supra note 39, at 16. 
 212 Martinez, supra note 16, at 166, 191. 
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light of the rule permitting those subject to attack to take 
defensive measures, this allocation of risk might be entirely 
appropriate.213 
5.  Object and Purpose of the Treaty 
Under the interpretive approach of the Vienna Convention, a 
treaty should be considered “in the light of its object of 
purpose.”214  The purpose to be examined is not merely the 
purpose of the individual rule under consideration, but that of 
the treaty as a whole.215  Here, both sides of the debate over the 
permissibility of anticipatory self-defense can marshal 
compelling arguments.  Those favoring a restrictive approach are 
aided by the Charter’s manifest focus on keeping interstate 
violence to a minimum.216  An interpretation of the right of self-
defense that unnecessarily increases the likelihood that force will 
be used, such as the interpretation articulated by the permissive 
school, is inconsistent with this overriding goal.217  Their 
interpretation allows the self-defense exception to override the 
prohibition on using force.218  The permissive interpretation gives 
rise to circumstances in which creative argument might justify 
any use of force by connecting its use to speculation about some 
future threat that might reasonably—whether rightly or 
wrongly—be perceived as imminent.219  In an era where deadly 
weapons are capable of widespread and serious harm, the 
dangers of resorting to force are compounded.220 
Similarly, the Charter is designed to ensure the operation of 
mechanisms guided toward the peaceful settlement of 
international disputes.221  Achievement of this purpose may be 
thwarted if the right of self-defense is construed too broadly.  If 
states can anticipate potential attacks and respond with force 
before they occur, the underlying disputes that engendered 
hostility between the states may give rise to interstate violence 
before mechanisms that promote peaceful settlements of 
 
 213 Sofaer, supra note 95, at 97-98. 
 214 U.N. Conference, supra note 76, at art. 31, para. 1. 
 215 U.N. Conference, supra note 76, at art. 31, para. 1 (stating that “[a] treaty shall be 
interpreted . . . in the light of its object and purpose”) (emphasis added). 
 216 See Charney, supra note 69, at 836 (calling this focus “the primary goal of the 
United Nations Charter”). 
 217 See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 259 (noting situations in which the use of 
anticipatory self-defense may be open to objections). 
 218 See O’CONNELL, supra note 208, at 5, 16. 
 219 O’CONNELL, supra note 208, at 16; see also Jorge Alberto Ramirez, Iraq War: 
Anticipatory Self-Defense or Unlawful Unilateralism? 34 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 1, 23-24 (2003) 
(discussing the dangers of broadening the use of anticipatory self-defense). 
 220 See Schachter, The Right of States, supra note 129, at 1634. 
 221 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3; Simma, supra note 29, at 105-07. 
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international disputes have a chance to work.222  The time 
available for peaceful dispute resolution to function is reduced, 
possibly by a significant amount, depending upon the accuracy of 
the estimation as to the imminence of the attack by the state 
exercising its right of self-defense. 
Additionally, the Charter’s language was meant to be 
functional in nature and capable of practical application.223  The 
restrictionist school of thought believes that Article 51 imposes 
such a rule in the context of self-defense:  the use of force is 
justified if an armed attack occurs, and is not if an armed attack 
has yet to occur.224  Those advancing a permissive interpretation 
of the right of self-defense favor a considerably less certain 
analysis based only upon the customary standard rather than the 
objectively determinable criteria of the occurrence of an armed 
attack.225  The rule as permissively interpreted is more difficult 
to apply, and the risk of error is increased.226  The benefits of a 
clear rule are lost.  Requiring an armed attack before using force 
in self-defense clearly informs states of the activity they must 
avoid in order to prevent force being used against them.  The 
permissive approach also leaves states less certain as to what 
preventive measures they can take to avoid the permissible use 
of force against them. 
Those favoring the permissive approach can agree that the 
Charter was meant to produce a soundly-functioning 
international system, but need not accept the restrictive 
approach’s viewpoint of what such a system entails.  Under this 
view, the Charter established a framework within which 
international peace and security can be maintained with the 
states themselves as primary beneficiaries.  States, and their 
sovereignty and integrity, were to be preserved by the U.N. 
rather than subsumed into a world government.227  Diminution of 
the scope of the “inherent” right of self-defense would amount to 
an unwarranted intrusion into a fundamental aspect of 
 
 222 See CASSESE, supra note 46, at 217 (noting scope of obligation to peacefully settle 
disputes). 
 223 See FRANCK, supra note 106, at 6-7. 
 224 See O’CONNELL, supra note 208, at 19 (“An attack must be underway or must have 
already occurred in order to trigger the right of unilateral self-defense.”). 
 225 Eckert & Mofidi, supra note 15, at 149; see also CASSESE, supra note 46, at 309 
(discussing historical examples of customary standards). 
 226 CASSESE, supra note 46, at 309; BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 259; O’CONNELL, 
supra note 208, at 19. 
 227 See U.N. Charter art. 2 (distinguishing between “[t]he Organization and its 
Members,” acknowledging by implication that its Members are “sovereign,” and clarifying 
that “[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state”). 
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sovereignty.228  Self-defense is too fundamental to this 
sovereignty to have artificial time limits placed upon it by the 
Charter or customary law. 
In addition, the Council has been only modestly successful in 
performing its primary function of achieving sustained peace.229  
The Charter was intended to be a holistic scheme for ensuring 
international peace, safeguarding states from aggression and 
preserving the right of self-defense as a supplement to the 
collective mechanism embodied in the Council.230  The Council’s 
limited success thus far suggests that the purpose of maintaining 
international peace and security may not be fulfilled unless force 
in self-defense may be exercised in more than the narrowest of 
circumstances.231 
Furthermore, as a practical matter, the permissive school 
can argue that the Charter should not be interpreted as a suicide 
pact that illegalizes defensive actions necessary for a state to 
preserve itself.232  Since the Charter was signed in June 1945, the 
weapons available to states have become even more destructive.  
Such weapons may enable an attacker to strike a decisive blow 
against its victim in one stroke.  By the time an attack is 
underway, it may simply be too late to take measures in self-
defense.233  If the law guarantees that the attacker may strike 
first, it has effectively rewarded that state’s violence with 
military advantage.234  The purpose of the Charter was certainly 
not to encourage violence or to deprive states of the ability to 
take reasonable steps to defend themselves.  The restrictive view 
impedes resort to the right of self-defense, potentially making 
resort to violence acceptable and advantageous to states in a 




 228 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 229 See, e.g., Patrick McLain, Settling the Score with Saddam: Resolution 1441 and 
Parallel Justifications for the Use of Force against Iraq, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L. L. 233, 
258 (2003); see also Gray, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 25, at 590 (indicating that 
Chapter VII enforcement by the Security Council did not proceed as originally planned). 
 230 See FRANCK, supra note 106, at 3. 
 231 See McLain, supra note 229, at 258-59 (suggesting this notion, but ultimately 
rejecting the argument that current law allows for unilateral action based on the Security 
Council’s ineffectiveness). 
 232 See Martinez, supra note 16, at 162-63. 
 233 See Martinez, supra note 16, at 162-63. 
 234 See BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 276 (suggesting but disagreeing with this 
argument). 
 235 See FRANCK, supra note 106, at 178 (noting that “[l]aw . . . does not thrive . . . 
when it grossly offends most persons’ common moral sense of what is right”). 
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III.  EVALUATION OF THE ASSERTED RIGHT TO USE PREEMPTIVE 
FORCE IN SELF-DEFENSE 
The divide between the interpretive approaches to the right 
of self-defense runs deep, and the state of the law with respect to 
the availability of anticipatory self-defense is likely to remain 
unclear.  However, fairly widespread agreement exists as to the 
substance of the customary rules limiting the exercise of self-
defense.236  Even those who assert the validity of anticipatory 
self-defense generally agree that customary rules limit its 
exercise.237  Regardless of one’s position on the interpretation of 
Article 51, using force in self-defense in contravention of this 
minimal customary standard will assuredly violate international 
law. 
The preemptive use of force in self-defense, which was 
enunciated as the U.S. strategy in the NSS and was suggested as 
a possible justification for the Iraq war, must be evaluated in 
light of these standards.  Initially, the NSS’s suggestion that 
agreement on the permissibility of anticipatory self-defense has 
existed “[f]or centuries” must be a reference to the period before 
recourse to force was prohibited as a general matter by the 
Charter, subject to a carefully-worded recognition of the right to 
self-defense.238  Since the Charter’s adoption, two schools of 
thought on anticipatory self-defense have existed.  The restrictive 
position, far from viewing such action as capable of being taken 
“lawfully” or with “legitimacy,” categorically bars using force in 
self-defense before an armed attack occurs.239  The NSS’s 
preemptive strategy does not comport with this position because 
the U.S. plans to use defensive force long before potential 
attackers are prepared to act.240 
Moreover, even if the NSS is considered in light of the 
permissive approach to the right of self-defense, the preemptive 
strategy does not pass muster.  First, even a permissive 
interpretation of Article 51 cannot completely do away with the 
 
 236 GRAY, USE OF FORCE, supra note 15, at 105 (“As part of the basic core of self-
defence all states agree that self-defence must be necessary and proportionate.”). 
 237 See, e.g., Louis Rene Beres, Preserving the Third Temple: Israel’s Right of 
Anticipatory Self-Defense Under International Law, 26 VAND.  J. TRANSNAT’L L. 111, 147-
48 (1993); see also SINGH, supra note 39, at 16 (discussing limits on the use of anticipatory 
self-defense). 
 238 See NSS, supra note 2, at 15 (explaining the evolving concept of “imminent threat” 
since the Cold War); Simma, supra note 29, at 114-15 (discussing that before the 
twentieth century, the use of force was not prohibited under international law); 
BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 40-41 (presumably, the NSS refers to these old 
justifications). 
 239 See, e.g., American Soc’y of Int’l Law, Self-Defense in an age of Terrorism, supra 
note 101, at 147-48. 
 240 See NSS, supra note 2, at 15. 
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requirement of an armed attack.241  To the extent that 
preemptive self-defense is asserted to justify the use of force 
against speculative threats that bear no relation to any armed 
attack, the Charter will bar the claim.242  Second, customary 
rules are likely to foreclose the permissibility of preemptive self-
defense if circumstances arise in which Article 51 does not.  
Unjustifiable preemptive self-defense differs from potentially 
permissible anticipatory self-defense in that it allows states to 
unleash force against one another with much greater ease.243  
Anticipatory self-defense, as advocated by most adherents to the 
permissive interpretation of self-defense, is impermissible if a 
state cannot demonstrate that a threat actually exists and is 
imminent.244  In contrast, preemptive self-defense, such as that 
called for by the NSS, permits the use of force by states that 
merely feel threatened, without requiring a showing of 
objectively verifiable indications that the asserted threat 
warrants the use of force in reply.245  Proportionality becomes 
virtually impossible to measure as to preemptive force, because 
no attack has occurred, is occurring, or is planned as to which the 
use of force must be proportionate.246  A legal regime that would 
permit the preemptive use of force in self-defense would be far 
too careless in its handling of the use of interstate force, a 
fearsome villain who the parties to the Charter knew from 
personal experience247 had to be kept in shackles of law.248 
Second, those advocating a permissive approach agree with 
their restrictive-minded counterparts that the use of force in self-
defense must be restrained by the customary law concepts of 
 
 241 See U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 4 (suggesting that although member states must 
refrain from threatening or using force where inconsistent with the Charter, they may 
threaten or use force when it is not inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations). 
 242 See, e.g., O’CONNELL, supra note 208, at 6 (“[W]here a state is threatened by force 
not amounting to an armed attack, it must resort to measures less than armed self-
defense . . . .”). 
 243 See CASSESE, supra note 46, at 310 (suggesting that “risks of abuse” might arise in 
a legal regime that permitted pre-emptive strikes) (emphasis omitted). 
 244 E.g., SINGH, supra note 39, at 16; Simma, supra note 29, at 803 (noting that many 
advocates of anticipatory self-defense view it as incorporating a requirement of 
imminence). 
 245 O’CONNELL, supra note 208, at 21 (identifying concerns with the subjective nature 
of the determination of when a sufficient threat has arisen, and characterizing the U.S. 
justification for preemptive war as based on “speculative concerns about [a] state’s 
possible future actions”); CASSESE, supra note 46, at 310 (“[P]re-emptive strikes . . . may 
be[] based on subjective and arbitrary appraisals by individual States.”). 
 246 O’CONNELL, supra note 208, at 19. 
 247 See U.N. Charter pmbl.  (prominently evincing the widely shared desire “to save 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought 
untold sorrow to mankind”). 
 248 See U.N. Charter art. 2, paras. 3-4; see also SHAW, supra note 50, at 681 
(remarking that “the law must seek to provide mechanisms to restrain and punish the 
resort to violence”). 
BORDELON FINAL SENT TO COPY 12/14/2005 5:27 PM 
2005] The Illegality of the U.S. Policy 143 
necessity and proportionality.249  However, one cannot assess the 
facts and circumstances that give rise to the necessity of the use 
of force, and confine its proportions, before the attack actually 
occurs.250  For adherents of the restrictive view, this is one reason 
why an armed attack must actually have occurred before force is 
used in self-defense.  For adherents of the permissive view, the 
requirement that the armed attack be imminent assuages 
concerns about the availability of facts sufficient to draw 
conclusions about whether a given use of force is justified. 
The NSS, however, does not require a showing of an 
imminent threat before authorizing preemptive uses of force.  
The administration explains that, “as a matter of common sense 
and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats 
before they are fully formed.”251  Indeed, the U.S. strategy 
expressly seeks to “adapt the concept of imminent threat,” 
apparently allowing for force to be used “preemptively,” “even if 
uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s 
attack,” and even before “dangers gather.”252  U.S. action against 
Iraq demonstrates that the NSS’s notion of imminence does not 
require an immediate or tremendous threat by a potential 
attacker.253  Indeed, if the Iraq situation is any guide, a threat 
may be sufficient to trigger NSS authorization to use force in 
purported self-defense if it is little more than plausible or even a 
hypothetical threat. 
If the rules regulating the use of force are relaxed to reflect 
U.S. policy, conflicts may arise that could be prevented if the 
rules governing self-defense continue to require a truly imminent 
threat.254  The U.S. position may also produce interstate violence 
by creating an increased incidence of improper uses of force by 
states that feel less reluctant to use force purportedly in self-
defense than in the past.255  Moreover, a standard that relies on a 
considerably less imminent threat is more likely to give rise to 
mistakes by the defenders as to whether they faced a threat at 
 
 249 See Van den hole, supra note 22, at 97 (one of many articles asserting the 
permissibility of anticipatory self-defense while agreeing that the customary rules apply 
to its exercise); see also GRAY, USE OF FORCE, supra note 15, at 105 (discussing the 
agreement of states as to the necessity and proportionality requirements of self-defense). 
 250 See BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 259. 
 251 NSS, supra note 2, at Introduction. 
 252 NSS, supra note 2, at 15. 
 253 See Eckert & Mofidi, supra note 15, at 126 (noting the wide discrepancies between 
the U.S. assertions of the existence of a threat stemming from weapons of mass 
destruction that were used to justify the action against Iraq, and Iraq’s apparent lack of 
such weapons). 
 254 Ramirez, supra note 219, at 23-24; BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 259. 
 255 BROWNLIE, supra note 44, at 259. 
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all.256  As the evidentiary problems with the case for self-defense 
in Iraq demonstrate, the U.S. government will experience 
mistakes with its current understanding of the self-defense 
rule.257  The abandonment of the requirement of an imminent 
threat leaves no principled means by which the law can 
distinguish force used in self-defense from aggression.258  The 
Bush administration’s understanding of the constraints of 
customary law on self-defense is at variance with that law in its 
present form. 
Thus, the U.S. position in the NSS may be best described as 
an argument for a change in the law.  Some writers have argued, 
on the assumption that the use of force in self-defense can be 
permitted before an armed attack occurs, that the war in Iraq is 
state practice that provides evidence of a change in the 
customary law loosening the constraints of necessity and 
proportionality.259  Some scholars have gone further, arguing that 
the prohibition on the use of force has come to lack vitality, and 
that the use of force for purposes such as preemptive self-defense 
is no longer forbidden.260  These arguments are misplaced.  The 
creation of a new customary rule traditionally requires “an 
established, widespread, and consistent practice”261 combined 
with “evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory 
by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.”262  The practice of 
justifying the use of force on grounds of preemptive or 
anticipatory self-defense is not consistent or widespread.263  
Furthermore, the psychological element of opinio juris is not 
present: the U.S. has conceded that “[it] must adapt the concept 
of imminent threat” as currently understood,264 and many other 
states apparently view the U.S. justification of self-defense for 
the preemptive use of force in Iraq as inappropriate.265  This 
refusal to treat divergent state practice as an emerging 
customary rule suggests the continued vitality of existing 
 
 256 The U.S. requires less information about the purported attacker’s disposition to 
justify the use of force as compared to the current permissive view of anticipatory self-
defense.  See NSS, supra note 2, at Introduction, 15. 
 257 Eckert & Mofidi, supra note 15, at 127-28. 
 258 See, e.g., American Soc’y of Int’l Law, supra note 101, at 151-52. 
 259 See, e.g., Cohan, supra note 95, at 292, 356. 
 260 Martinez, supra note 16, at 164.  Contra Michael Byers, Terrorism, the Use of 
Force and International Law after 11 September, 51 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 401, 410-11 
(2002). 
 261 Thirlway, supra note 24, at 125. 
 262 Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3, 90 (July 25). 
 263 GRAY, USE OF FORCE, supra note 15, at 112. 
 264 NSS, supra note 2, at 15. 
 265 David P. Fidler, International Law and Weapons of Mass Destruction: End of the 
Arms Control?, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 39, 72-73 (2004); Eckert & Mofidi, supra note 
15, at 127. 
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rules.266  Finally, from a policy standpoint, it cannot be denied 
that the elimination or substantial weakening of the rules 
restricting the use of force would have a deleterious effect on 
international order, potentially unleashing anarchy as states 
other than the U.S. come to view the use of force as a permissible 
means of resolving their disputes.267 
Perhaps to avoid the negative impact of other states’ 
assertions of a right to use preemptive force, the NSS appears to 
have taken an extreme approach.  The NSS can be read to argue 
that different rules should apply to constrain the use of force by 
the U.S., and that these rules should be relatively permissive.268  
This approach, however, is difficult to square with the U.N.’s 
fundamental “principle of the sovereign equality of all its 
Members.”269  While states are not equal in other respects, each 
should be treated as a formal equal of the others for purposes of 
applying the rules of international law.270  Exceptional 
approaches subvert this important principle.  They place 
international law in the unsatisfying position of serving as an 
ongoing and evolving apologia for the actions of powerful 
states.271  They are also inconsistent with basic notions of 
 
 266 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J 14, 98 (June 27). 
 267 See Martinez, supra note 16, at 164-65 (discussing these concerns in the context of 
the debate over the permissibility of anticipatory self-defense); see also Eckert & Mofidi, 
supra note 15, at 150 (warning of the danger of leaving states with “a loose, 
unsubstantiated notion of ‘preemptive self-defense’”); O’CONNELL, supra note 208, at 19 
(discussing possible effects of America’s precedent). 
 268 See NSS, supra note 2, at 15 (the NSS briefly refers to international law, but then 
asserts that “[w]e must adapt” it.  The document then indicates that “[t]he United States 
has long maintained the option of preemptive actions.”  Implicit in these remarks is the 
suggestion that the U.S. can unilaterally change international law, and that it possesses 
rights under that law that may differ from those of other states); see also Michael Byers & 
Simon Chesterman, Changing the Rules About Rules? Unilateral Humanitarian 
Intervention and the Future of International Law, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: 
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administration’s approach to international relations generally); Detlev F. Vagts, 
Hegemonic International Law, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 843, 843-48 (2001) (suggesting the 
applicability of special international rules to hegemons). 
 269 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1 (“The Organization is based on the principle of the 
sovereign equality of all its Members.”). 
 270 U.N. Charter, art. 2, para 1; see CASSESE, supra note 46, at 88, 90; Simma, supra 
note 29, at 85; see also Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 141 (explaining that 
“[a]ll states . . . have equal rights and duties and are equal members of the international  
community”). 
 271 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Liberal International Relations Theory and 
International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 717, 724 (1995) (summarizing 
the argument that international law can be aimed either at meaningfully constraining 
state behavior or as merely justifying it at every turn); see also THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF 
THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 402 (Rex Warner trans., Penguin Books 1972) (1954) (“[W]hen 
these matters are discussed by practical people, the standard of justice depends on the 
equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do 
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fairness in an international system that has long been governed 
by rules that are the product of states’ mutual consent.272 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The strategy of preemptive self-defense articulated by the 
U.S. in the NSS, and apparently applied against Iraq, is at odds 
with current norms governing the use of force in self-defense.  In 
order for the preemptive use of force to be lawful 
notwithstanding the Charter’s prohibition of the use of force, U.S. 
strategy would have to comport with the Charter and customary 
law relevant to the right of self-defense.  Application of either of 
the prevailing interpretations of the right of self-defense leads to 
the conclusion that the U.S. strategy does not comply with 
international law.  The U.S. strategy calls for resorting to force at 
an earlier stage than the Charter and customary law permit.  
Consequently, unless and until changes to the law are made that 
render the U.S. position regarding preemptive force compatible 
with the law governing self-defense, the U.S.’s “threat or use of 
force” in the circumstances identified in its  strategy will remain 
inconsistent with international law.273 
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